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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF: A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING LAW

INTRODUCTION
A recent urban development project in St. Louis’ north side generated
tremendous legal and political controversy. Like many development projects in
the area, it sought tax increment financing (TIF) as its core source of start-up
funding. At stake was over $390 million in TIF funding, by far the most in
Missouri history,1 for the 1,500-acre urban development widely held to be the
only real hope to revitalize the long-stagnant north side.2
The battle lines were drawn and played out in Missouri courts, as well as
the local media. Proponents of the TIF, which included the City of St. Louis
and local aldermen,3 maintained that the plan of developer Paul McKee and his
“NorthSide Regeneration LLC” was the only viable hope of redirecting the
area away from many decades of decline.4 Denying the TIF would mean
denying a project that embodied the core legislative justification for TIF: urban
renewal.5 They argued that such a massive project required flexibility to evolve
and meet market demand, and that judicial oversight of a project already

1. Tim Logan, NorthSide TIF Back in Court This Week, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov.
26, 2012, at A1, A4.
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Give NorthSide a Chance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 21,
2012, at A18 [hereinafter Give NorthSide a Chance] (“[McKee’s] working in a part of the city
that began hollowing out in the 1950s. If it was going to spontaneously regenerate, it would have
done so by now. And we don’t see a lot of other developers standing in line to do business
there.”).
3. See Missouri ex rel. Smith v. TIF Comm’rs (Smith I), No. 0922-CC09379, 2010 WL
7352897, at *2–3 (Mo. 22d Cir. July 2, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. St. Louis, No. ED95733,
2012 WL 2317240 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 S.W.3d
20, 26 (Mo. 2013) (“Defendants-respondents included the City of St. Louis, the members of the
City’s Tax Increment Financing Commission, the Mayor, and all members of the Board of
Aldermen, as well as NorthSide Regeneration, LLC, the proponent of the NorthSide
Redevelopment Plan.” Plaintiffs-petitioners included Bonzella Smith, a resident in the area to be
affected by the proposed TIF.).
4. Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Gentrification by TIF, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2012, at
A14 [hereinafter Gentrification by TIF].
255
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approved by local government amounted to judicial activism and legislating
from the bench.6
The trial court judge summarized the key issue in his decision: “The
question before the Court, fundamentally, is whether the City’s Board of
Aldermen had the discretion to say, in Alderman Bosley’s words, ‘Let’s try it.’
The Court concludes that the answer must be, ‘No.’”7 The trial court held that
the massive redevelopment project impacting two square miles of urban land
lacked the specificity of a “discrete, definable redevelopment project” required
by the TIF statute.8 However, the finding of blight, also required by statute,
though challenged, was found to be supported by “incontestable evidence.”9
The developer, Paul McKee of NorthSide Regeneration, acknowledged
that disallowing the TIF funding would prevent the entire multimillion dollar
redevelopment project, one of the largest in St. Louis history, from getting
started.10 McKee lost again in the Missouri Court of Appeals,11 but the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on procedural grounds,
largely side-stepping the substantive issues.12 The core issues behind the
challenge to the TIF remain largely undecided in Missouri.13
While the Missouri Supreme Court was deciding the NorthSide case, on
the other side of the St. Louis metro area, a number of other controversial TIF
projects of a different sort were being debated during the same week in January
2013.14 These were targeted, discrete and definable projects unlikely to have
statutory issues with specificity. Two involved TIF subsidies for Wal-Mart

6. See Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, ST. LOUIS AM., Nov. 21,
2012, at A11, available at http://www.stlamerican.com/news/political_eye/article_70918aec-32
61-11e2-a1e1-0019bb2963f4.html?mode=print.
7. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *2.
8. Id. at *46.
9. Id. at *28.
10. See Logan, supra note 1, at A1.
11. Smith v. St. Louis (Smith II), No. ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App.
E.D. June 19, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. 2013).
12. Smith v. St. Louis (Smith III), 395 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding “the
judgment [of the lower court] went beyond the scope of pleadings”). The Smith cases at the
circuit, appellate, and Missouri Supreme Court are also referred to as the “NorthSide cases” or the
“McKee cases” in this article, in keeping with references by local media and the court.
13. See, e.g., Tim Logan, NorthSide TIF Wins Backing of High Court, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2013, at A6 (“The judges didn’t directly tackle the legality of NorthSide’s
$390 million tax increment financing package or TIF law more broadly, instead ruling largely on
a procedural issue.”).
14. See Steve Giegerich, Wal-Mart Dispute Headed to Court, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 20, 2013, at B3 [hereinafter Wal-Mart Dispute]; Steve Giegerich, Shrewsbury Board
Approves Wal-Mart Proposal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/shrewsbury-board-approves-walmart-proposal/article_a78be785-b679-5763-a8
ae-230a71b9bed2.html [hereinafter Shewsbury Wal-Mart Proposal].
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Supercenters in separate St. Louis area municipalities, one in Shrewsbury and
one in Ellisville.15
Large numbers of residents and community leaders, along with local
media, protested the Wal-Mart and similar TIFs as a waste of taxpayer funds.16
They ridiculed the finding of “blight” in suburban shopping areas in order to
obtain TIF, and complained about lack of fair representation in the TIF
approval process.17 Both the Ellisville and the Shrewsbury Wal-Mart proposals
were rejected by their respective local TIF commissions18 which are required
by statute and are appointed specifically to review and assess the impacts of
each TIF on the community.19 One Ellisville TIF Commissioner found the
project to be a “gross overuse” of TIF incentives.20 Both the Ellisville and the
Shrewsbury Boards of Aldermen overrode the recommendation of the TIF
boards and approved the TIFs, which is permissible under Missouri statutory
TIF procedure.21 While approval of the McKee NorthSide TIF funding
affecting two square miles of the St. Louis inner city was rejected by the trial
and appellate courts and, as a result, was tied up for over three years, TIF
funding for the two Wal-Marts was approved in accordance with TIF statute
and did not face such challenges in the courts.22
The theory behind TIF is relatively straightforward, but the practice has
been controversial for decades.23 Much of the controversy today stems from
the evolution of TIF so that it now subsidizes shopping mall development in
the same way, with the same statutory framework, as it originally subsidized
inner city redevelopment.
This note looks at the Missouri cases involving the McKee NorthSide
redevelopment and examines the statutory structure that has given rise to
apparent inequities in taxpayer funding of TIF redevelopment. The note
proposes a change in Missouri TIF legislation to address these issues and to
clarify statutory standards so developers of both large- and small-scale projects

15. See sources cited supra note 14.
16. See Wal-Mart Dispute, supra note 14.
17. See Gentrification by TIF, supra note 5.
18. See sources cited supra note 14.
19. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820 (2010).
20. Editorial, Retail Roulette, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 2012, at A12.
21. § 99.820.
22. Wal-Mart Dispute, supra note 14. A dispute over the proposed construction of the
Ellisville Wal-Mart did, in fact, end up in court. However, it was the “conditional use permit” that
was challenged, a completely separate issue from the TIF. The Ellisville Wal-Mart TIF was
approved in accordance with the TIF statute, and the $10.8 million in TIF funding has not been
challenged. See id.
23. See, e.g., Joyce Y. Man, Introduction to TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 1, 4–6 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (outlining criticisms of TIF
going back to the 1980s and 1990s).
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can be clearer on the law and their funding, and so courts can adjudicate
effectively without excessive interpretation of statutory terms.
This note advocates adopting legislation that would create two tiers of TIF
in Missouri law. The first TIF tier, more in keeping with the original intent of
TIF as an incentive for redevelopment and regeneration of neighborhoods,24
would be targeted at district-wide TIFs and require adherence to strict
standards of blight not presently in Missouri TIF law. However, it would allow
more flexibility in contingent projects within the TIF plan, and provide
additional incentives for redevelopment. The second tier of TIF would be more
in keeping with current application of TIF as a purely developmental tool for
specific projects in all neighborhoods. It would eliminate essentially
meaningless blight requirements in current Missouri TIF law.25
The note is divided into four parts. Focusing on Missouri, Part I overviews
the basics of TIF law, outlining its general background and evolution, the
theory behind TIF, and detailing its procedural and substantive elements as
well as how developers, TIF commissions, and local government interact to
approve a TIF. Part II examines Missouri court rulings involving blight and
specificity, with special concentration on the NorthSide cases and their context
with other cases in TIF law, as well as a clarification of deference standards
given local government by the courts in TIF cases. Part II also looks at popular
reaction to the NorthSide cases. Part III looks at the rationale for legislative
change in TIF law proposed in this note: making the blight test meaningful and
assuring specificity and accountability on the part of developers. Part III also
examines the broader political and economic background of TIF law that lends
support to the changes advocated, with special attention to current criticism
and attempted reform of TIF. Part IV summarizes the proposed changes to
Missouri TIF law advocated in this note.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
A.

General Background and Evolution of TIF

Since its origins in California in 1952, Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has
evolved from a targeted incentive to spur urban renewal to the most popular
form of public finance for local economic development projects in the United

24. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
25. See generally Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing In Missouri: Is It Time For Blight
And But-For To Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019 (2001) (proposing the elimination of blight
requirement from Missouri TIF law). This note advocates Mr. Reinert’s proposed elimination of
the blight standard, but expands on the proposal to address project specificity and accountability
concerns. See id.
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States.26 Today, almost all states have authorized TIF and over half of U.S.
cities with populations over 100,000 have used TIF.27 Missouri use of TIF is
high, ranking third in total TIF bond sales out of 35 states surveyed for the
period 2005–2010.28
TIF began with the limited purpose of clearing and rehabilitating “urban
decay in downtown areas,” but has evolved in recent years to become “an allpurpose economic development tool.”29 It has moved far beyond its initial core
purpose for urban redevelopment to its current, more general application to
subsidize developers in a range of development projects; TIF has expanded
from “redevelopment” to “simply development.”30 The McKee NorthSide
project could be characterized as “redevelopment;” the Ellisville and
Shrewsbury Wal-Marts would more likely be characterized as “simply
development.”
As in the rest of the country,31 proposed TIF projects in Missouri now
range widely in scope and purposefrom the 1,560-acre McKee NorthSide
project in the core of St. Louis City impacting a potential 10,000 new homes32
to the area within single stand-alone buildings, from shopping malls in affluent
suburban areas to rural properties on farmland. Despite the tremendous
variation in scope and purpose, each of these projects must meet the same
criteria set forth in the Missouri TIF statute.33

26. See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010); COUNCIL OF DEV.
FIN. AGENCIES & INT’L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CTRS., TAX INCREMENT FINANCE BEST
PRACTICES REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2007) available at http://www.icsc.org/government/CDFA.pdf
[hereinafter TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE].
27. Briffault, supra note 26, at 70.
28. Randal O’Toole, Crony Capitalism and Social Engineering: The Case Against TaxIncrement Financing, 676 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 11–12 (2011), available at
http://www.cato.org/publications/archives/studies/policy-analysis/2011. Missouri also ranked
fourth in per capita TIF bond sales. Id.
29. Reinart, supra note 25, at 1023.
30. See Briffault, supra note 26, at 71 (“The redirection, or expansion, of TIF is best
captured through the change in the language used to describe TIF activity from redevelopment—
that is, the revitalization of a once vibrant but now economically depressed or physically
deteriorated area—to simply development, or increase in economic activity in an area that might
have been vacant, farmland, undeveloped, or simply lightly developed.”).
31. See id. at 68.
32. Rebecca S. Rivas, Supreme Court Hears Northside’s Appeal, ST. LOUIS AM., Dec. 6–12,
2012, at A1.
33. Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§
99.800–99.865 (2010).
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How TIF Works

The theory behind TIF is relatively straightforward. Tax revenues
generated by the redevelopment itself (the incremental taxes) are diverted back
into the project, and become a repayment stream to fund the core costs of the
project.34 Real estate taxes in the redevelopment area are frozen at the predevelopment level.35 The real estate taxes generated from the increased
valuation resulting from the development is referred to as the “increment.”36
The real estate tax increments can be supplemented in some states, such as
Missouri, with percentages of certain other local taxes generated by the new
economic activities in the development, such as sales and utility taxes, which
form the repayment funds that are channeled back to the project’s costs.37
TIFs are almost invariably presented by their promoters as self-financing, a
“pay-for-itself” redevelopment tool, requiring no need for additional taxes.38
As the attorney for St. Louis developer McKee argued in oral arguments in
front of the Missouri Supreme Court, “this is not a handout subsidy. It’s a
reimbursement. Nobody gets a single dime until you do the work to the
satisfaction of the city.”39
C. Procedural Implementation of TIF: The Role of Local Government
Both substantive and procedural requirements of TIF are usually governed
by statute.40 The Missouri Real Property Tax Increment Allocation
Redevelopment Act41 (the “TIF Act”) is a typical state TIF statute.42

34. See JAMES E. MELLO ET AL., SUMMARY OF THE MISSOURI REAL PROPERTY TAX
INCREMENT ALLOCATION REDEVELOPMENT ACT 1 (2010), available at http://www.armstrong
teasdale.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Summary%20of%20MO%20Real%20Property-89924451.PDF; MICHAEL P. KELSAY, UNEVEN PATCHWORK: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN KANSAS
CITY 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ordredirect.html?open&id=Kel
sayKansasCity.html.
35. MELLO ET AL., supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2 (“The tax increment from a
TIF district is created without raising taxes and without dipping into the tax value present at the
time of adoption”); David Callies & Andrew Gowder, Jr., Introduction to TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING xxi, xxi (David Callies & Andrew Gowder, Jr., eds., ABA Publishing, 2012) (“In
theory, the diverted [TIF] stream is ‘free money’ used to pay for the redevelopment and then
returned to its rightful place as part of a now-enhanced stream of revenue to the governmental
bodies that levy such taxes on the property in the first place.”)
39. Nicholas Phillips, Listen to Oral Argument from Yesterday’s High Court Battle Over
Paul McKee’s Project, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.
com/dailyrft/2012/11/oral_argument_supreme_court_mckee_north_side.php.
40. See Cory C. VanDyke, Fields of Dreams: The Expectation And Common Reality Of Tax
Increment Financing, 79 UMKC L. REV. 791, 794 (2011).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF

261

Local government plays the operative role in the approval and actual
implementation of a TIF project.43 In Missouri, a municipality must establish a
TIF commission, which is given broad powers to “review redevelopment
plans, keep all interested parties (including the public) informed of the
district’s progression, and ultimately control the decision-making power of the
TIF process.”44 The TIF commission consists of nine to twelve members, with
representatives from the overall county and school districts impacted by the tax
subsidy, in addition to the smaller municipality.45 For example, in St. Louis
County, municipal TIF commissions consist of six members appointed by the
county, three members appointed by the municipalities, two members
appointed by the school boards, and one member to represent other taxing
entities.46
When a TIF proposal is introduced by developers or urban planning
experts, it is the responsibility of the municipal TIF commission to create a
“redevelopment plan” to lay out fully the objectives of the plan and include
“estimated redevelopment project costs, the anticipated sources of funds to pay
for the costs, evidence of the commitments to finance the project costs” and
other financial information on the anticipated funding.47
After public hearings with strict notice and comment requirements, the TIF
commission votes and makes recommendations to the municipality’s
governing body, typically its board of aldermen, who then must decide whether
to implement the redevelopment plan by adopting ordinances.48 It is important
to note that the statute only requires that the TIF commission make a
recommendation and vote; it does not require that the commission approve the
TIF.49 If a TIF plan is voted down by the TIF commission, the municipality
can still approve it and move forward.50 Once the ordinances are approved by
the municipality, the statute authorizes the municipality to “make and enter
into all contracts necessary or incidental to the implementation and furtherance
of its redevelopment plan or project”51 and to use any and all means

41. See Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§
99.800–99.865 (2010).
42. MELLO ET AL., supra note 34.
43. See Briffault, supra note 26.
44. VanDyke, supra note 40, at 795.
45. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2 (2010).
46. See § 99.820.3; MELLO ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
47. § 99.810.
48. See § 99.820.1(1); Reinert, supra note 25, at 1030–31.
49. § 99.820
50. § 99.820.1(1) (explaining that if TIF commission opposes the plan, the municipality can
override the commission and approve it with a two-thirds majority vote; if the TIF commission
approves the plan, only a simple majority is required).
51. § 99.810.1(2).
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“reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of the redevelopment plan.”52
“Reasonable means” may include eminent domain.53
D. The “Redevelopment Area,” the “Redevelopment Plan,” and the
“Redevelopment Project”
It is important to recognize the statutory distinction between
redevelopment area, redevelopment plan and redevelopment project to fully
understand current issues relating to specificity in Missouri TIF law.54 The
“redevelopment area” must meet the substantive statutory requirements of the
“blight” and “but-for” tests described below. 55 It is the area designated by the
municipality that is subject of the redevelopment plan.56 The “redevelopment
plan” is a statement of general objectives and financial reports created by the
TIF commission and voted on by the municipal Board, and it is essentially the
ultimate vehicle for obtaining approval of TIF funding.57 This redevelopment
plan must “conform to the comprehensive plan for the development of the
municipality as a whole.”58 “Redevelopment project” is defined as simply “any
development project within a redevelopment area in furtherance of the
objectives of the redevelopment plan.”59 A “redevelopment project” is required
before approval of the overall redevelopment plan that initiates the TIF itself.60
The statutory interpretation of the specificity necessary for a redevelopment
project is the core issue that decided the McKee cases.61
E.

Substantive Elements of a TIF: The Blight and “But for” Tests

The substantive requirements of developments that qualify for TIF are
written into statutes that vary from state to state, but usually share three
common characteristics.62 First, the redevelopment area, sometimes referred to
52. § 99.810.1(3).
53. Id.
54. See § 99.805(12)-(14).
55. § 99.805 (12); § 99.805 (13).
56. § 99.805(11).
57. § 99.805(13) (defining “redevelopment plan” as “the comprehensive program of a
municipality for redevelopment intended by the payment of redevelopment costs to reduce or
eliminate those conditions, the existence of which qualified the redevelopment area as a blighted
area, conservation area, economic development area, or combination thereof, and to thereby
enhance the tax bases of the taxing districts which extend into the redevelopment area. Each
redevelopment plan shall conform to the requirements of section 99.810”). See also Smith I, 2010
WL 7352897, at *22, *25.
58. § 99.810.1 (2).
59. § 99.805 (13).
60. § 99.810.1(3).
61. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *45.
62. See TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, 18 MO. PRACTICE SERIES: REAL ESTATE LAW § 26:2 (3d
ed. 2006); See also Phillip J.F. Gehab, Tax Increment Financing Bonds as “Debt” Under State
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as a TIF district, typically must meet the statutory definition of “blight” or
“economic underutilization.”63 Second, the economic development would not
occur “but for” the development of the TIF.64 Finally, the redevelopment plan
must provide detailed economic impact plans and clear timeframes.65
In Missouri, the so-called “blighting test” does not necessarily require a
finding of “blight”; the test is met if the redevelopment area is a “blighted
area,” a “conservation area,” or an “economic development area.”66 “Blighted
area” is defined as:
an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street
layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements,
improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such
factors, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an
economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or
67
welfare in its present condition and use.

A “conservation area” is “not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”68 An “economic development area”
can be any area that is neither blighted nor a conservation area, but where “the
municipality finds that the redevelopment will not be solely used for
development of commercial businesses which unfairly compete in the local
economy.”69
The “but for” test requires that the proposed TIF area has “not been subject
to growth and development through investment by private enterprise and
would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of

Constitutional Debt Limitations, 41 URB. LAW. 725, 728 (2009); TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE,
supra note 26, at 8.
63. TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1(1) (2010). See also Reinert, supra note 25, at 1033.
67. § 99.805(1).
68. § 99.805(3) The full definition of a conservation area in the statute is an area where “fifty
percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of thirty-five years or more. Such an area
is not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and
may become a blighted area because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation;
obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of structures below
minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and
community facilities; lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive
land coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of
community planning.” Id.
69. § 99.805(5). To be an “economic development area,” the area must be in the public
interest because it will: (a) Discourage commerce, industry or manufacturing from moving their
operations to another state; or (b) Result in increased employment in the municipality; or (c)
Result in preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the municipality.
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tax increment financing.”70 In other words, the TIF must be the “but-for” cause
of the growth in taxes for the area and not existing market or socio-economic
factors that were already in place without the TIF.
II. MISSOURI COURT RULINGS ON TIF BLIGHT AND SPECIFICITY
A.

Cases of Statutory Blight

Although a redevelopment area must pass the “blight test” to receive TIF
funding in Missouri,71 the statutory requirements of “blight” are extremely
broad.72 In a controversial landmark case in 2001, the Missouri Court of
Appeals held that a redevelopment project within the West County Center
shopping mall in suburban St. Louis met the statutory definition of blighting
required for TIF, despite the fact that both the municipality and the trial court
found that the shopping center was “indisputably [the] City’s greatest
economic asset.”73 The suburban city, Des Peres, was the second wealthiest
municipality in the St. Louis area at the time.74 The court refused to “substitute
[its] judgment for that of the [municipal] Board . . . as to blighting.”75
Under the terms of the statute, the Court found that the municipality could
declare the shopping mall “blighted” under the Missouri TIF statute because of
such factors as: “its limited space for small retail shops inhibits growth” (thus,
“obsolete platting”); “improper subdivision . . . that constrain the ability to
expand the size of the mall;” “deteriorated site conditions” such as a faulty
roof; “problems with the mall’s water lines” (“potentially endanger mall
property”); and “evidence of a decline in sales at [the] shopping mall”
(“economic liability”).76 The court found plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasive
“that the blighting factors are minimally significant and do not dominate the
redevelopment area.”77

70. § 99.810.1(1).
71. In addition to a “blighted area”, a “conservation area” or “economic development area”
also passes the so-called “blight test” in the statute. Id.
72. See VanDyke supra note 40, at 799.
73. JG St. Louis W. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
2001).
74. See Reinert, supra note 25, at 1019.
75. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 518.
76. Id. Note that “obsolete platting;” “Improper subdivision,” “conditions which
endanger . . . property,” “deterioration of site improvements,” and “other causes, or any
combination of such factors . . . [that] constitutes an economic or social liability” are all elements
of the statutory definition of “blighted area” that were met by the West County Center shopping
mall, as determined by the municipality and as affirmed by the Court. See MO. REV. STAT. §
99.805(1) (2010).
77. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 519.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF

265

When such an expansive statutory definition of blighting is combined with
strong deference to the local municipality by the courts, and with precedents
such as the West County shopping mall case, Missouri courts rarely question a
municipality’s finding of blight.78
B.

Standard of Review: Deference to Local Government

It is important to understand the great deference courts are required to
show local government in typical TIF cases.79 The “[c]ourt’s role is narrowly
circumscribed” and the municipality is given a high level of deference.80 The
court must confine itself to determining if procedural mandates have been
observed, necessary findings have been made, and whether the municipality’s
ordinances are arbitrary, capricious, the product of fraud, collusion or bad
faith, or otherwise beyond the municipality’s powers.81 Even if the
municipality’s legislative findings are “fairly debatable” or “reasonably
doubtful,” the court has no authority to invalidate the ordinances.82
In other words, the court cannot simply substitute its judgment for the
municipal Board.83 The municipality is making a determination that is
considered “legislative” under the Missouri Constitution and treated as such by
the court.84 If the court finds, for example, there is a reasonable argument that
under the statute the redevelopment area is blighted or a redevelopment project
is specific enough, as determined by the municipality, then it must leave the
TIF approval intact. The municipality’s determination could even be
“doubtful,” but as long as it is “reasonably” doubtful, the court must not
disturb it.85 The court can only overturn the local government’s determination
if the determination is invalid beyond reasonable doubt.

78. See Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050.
79. TIF Cases for eminent domain have a less deferential standard and are subject to
constitutional demands. See generally Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897.
80. See, e.g., Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146,
159 (Mo. 1987); Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist. v. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d 827, 840 (Mo. Ct. App.
E.D. 2009); JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 519–20.
81. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 160; Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 840; JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d
at 517.
82. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836; JG St. Louis W. 41 S.W.3d at 517.
83. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 160; Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836; JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d
at 517.
84. Though municipalities do not have “inherent” legislative powers, the Missouri
Constitution may grant municipalities certain legislative powers. The Missouri TIF Act allows
municipalities to make legislative determinations as to what constitutes “blighted property.” See
Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050.
85. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d at 836.
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C. Specificity of the Project: The NorthSide TIF Cases
The key issue in Paul McKee’s redevelopment cases at the trial court86 and
Missouri Court of Appeals87 is different from the majority of TIF cases.88 The
case turned not on the blight requirement, but on the specificity in the
“redevelopment project” that the statute requires.89 In the trial court ruling,
Judge Dierker stated that the fundamental issue in the case was that the city
board did not have the discretion to approve a TIF and “try it.”90 The court
required specifically detailed projects.91
The finding of blight on the north St. Louis project area, though
challenged, was supported by “incontestable evidence of obsolete platting,
deterioration of site improvements, and higher than average crime rates.”92
The trial court found the NorthSide redevelopment plan approved by the
St. Louis Board of Aldermen did comply with statutory requirements.93
However, the trial court found the “fatal flaw” to be a lack of specificity in any
“discrete, definable redevelopment project” (emphasis added) as required by
statute, thus making the ordinances that created the TIF invalid.94 The trial
court noted that most TIF cases:
“have involved discrete, definable projects, such as the shopping center
upgrade in JG St. Louis West . . . Of late, however, the TIF redevelopment
plans have grown in grandeur and scope . . . The problem is, however, that
without a defined project, the TIF redevelopment process allows cities to
95
expand redevelopment area designations ad infinitum.”

The court made clear the distinction between a redevelopment “project” and a
redevelopment “plan”: “The plan is not the project. Concepts are not projects.
Projects are concrete, not hypothetical or abstract: sanitary sewers will be
constructed in City Block 1000, commencing on such-and-such a date, at an
estimated cost of so many dollars.”96 The court goes on to say that “the TIF act
requires that a redeveloper present ‘shovel-ready’ redevelopment projects.”97

86. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897.
87. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240.
88. State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
89. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *12.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *15.
92. Id. at *11.
93. Id. The statutory requirements of a “redevelopment plan” are minimal. Id. (citing
McGuire, 622 S.W.2d at 327 (the trial court found “all that was required was enough information
to permit the Board of Aldermen to determine the plan’s feasibility, and the courts ‘must
presume’ a certain expertise in the Board and the bureaucracy in evaluating such feasibility.”)).
94. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897 , at *18.
95. Id. at *18. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at *15.
97. Id. at *17–18.
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The court found that the developers used less specific language and
deliberately chose to omit defined projects, and seemed to imply a comparison
of McKee’s NorthSide development to a pipe dream, and the 1989 film, Field
of Dreams, with the classic line, “If you build it, they will come.”98
The trial court relied heavily on a Missouri Court of Appeals decision, City
of Shelbina v. Shelby County,99 where a TIF approved by the Missouri City of
Shelbina was struck down because it referenced only “aspirational goals and
conceptual frameworks” in its redevelopment plan and lacked any specific
projects.100 In Shelbina, the court held that the plain meaning of the statute101
required that a specific redevelopment project must be approved or acts
establishing the specific project must be approved prior to TIF approval by the
municipality.102 The court cited language in Shelbina’s TIF plan such as “may
be implemented,” “assumes that,” “envisions that,” “program concept is
intended to,” “could include,” and so forth, as indications that there was no
specific project in place.103 For example, the plan stated that it solicited
proposals for part of the development “intended to result in a scenario where a
property owned by the City will be redeveloped into . . . commercial uses
which could include a gas station . . . .”104 The court found that this language
made clear that the city did not have the specific projects required by statute
and invalidated the TIF.105
The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court decision in the
NorthSide case, finding the project specificity issues analogous to Shelbina:
“aspirational goals and conceptual frameworks” in the redevelopment plan, but
no “actual data regarding particular projects.”106 The court cited the
redevelopment plan as being “couched in terms of ‘anticipated,’ ‘may be,’
‘contemplated,’ and ‘depending on market demand’” generally describing
“NorthSide’s ideas for land use” but providing no “specifics detailing
impending redevelopment projects” and concluded “these ‘proposals’ are not
sufficient to be considered a project under Shelbina.”107 NorthSide attorneys
98. Id. at *1, *17.
99. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2008).
100. Id. at 253.
101. Id. The Court specifically cites Section 99.845.1 of the TIF statute which states “A
municipality, either at the time a redevelopment project is approved or, in the event a
municipality has undertaken acts establishing a redevelopment plan and redevelopment project
and has designated a redevelopment area after the passage and approval of Sections 99.800 to
99.865 . . . which acts are in conformance with the procedures of Sections 99.800 to 99.865, may
adopt tax increment allocation financing by passing an ordinance . . . (Emphasis added).”
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249, 253–54 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D 2008).
106. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *11.
107. Id.
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argued that Shelbina was distinguishable because there was no developer in
Shelbina and the TIF was only a vehicle for soliciting proposals for
redevelopment with a vague conceptual objective, unlike McKee and
NorthSide.108 Attorneys also argued that the trial court exercised “judicial
activism” not advocated by the appellate court in Shelbina, nor by the plain
meaning of the statute.109 The court found these arguments unpersuasive in its
ruling.110
From a procedural perspective, it was extraordinary that plaintiffs in the
trial court case did not even raise the issue of project specificity in their
pleadings, though that was the issue that decided the case.111 Plaintiffs’
pleading raised the issues of blight, the “but for” test, and the City’s good faith,
among other things.112 The trial court denied each of plaintiffs’ points in the
pleading, but the decision was made in favor of the plaintiffs on a separate
issue “detected by the Court,” which involved the statutorily required
specificity of the redevelopment project.113 Even the trial court acknowledged
that “there may be an argument that the defect in [the TIF] Ordinances . . .
detected by the Court was not fairly embraced by the pleadings in this case.”114
The trial court, however, accepted plaintiffs’ motions in limine and objections
at trial “as injecting specific claims of invalidity of the ordinances, and not as
mere evidentiary objections.”115 At the Missouri Court of Appeals, NorthSide
attorneys argued that a legal or factual challenge was never raised “based upon
a lack of sufficiency of the redevelopment project in [plaintiff’s] pleadings or
at trial,” and, therefore, the trial court’s judgment was void.116 The appellate
court upheld the validity of the judgment, finding that the redevelopment
project issue was “tried by the implied consent of the parties.”117
At the Missouri Supreme Court, however, in a 6-0 decision, the lower
court’s ruling on specificity of the project plan was set aside on procedural
grounds.118 The court held that:
“the petitions did not place Northside on notice that the specific project issue
was a subject of this litigation and, therefore, did not preserve that issue for
purposes of this case. . . the judgment went beyond the scope of pleadings and

108. Brief of Appellant at 41, NorthSide Regeneration LLC, Smith v. St. Louis, No.
ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012).
109. Id.
110. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *10–11.
111. See Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *2–3.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *18.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *4.
117. Id.
118. Smith III, 395 S.W.3d at 26, 24–26.
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is voidable to the extent that it provides that there are no defined
119
redevelopment projects or a cost-benefit analysis of such projects.”

The Missouri Supreme Court did not address the issue of TIF specificity in
its ruling120 and, thus, the issue has not been addressed fully and conclusively
in Missouri courts.121 Lawyers for plaintiffs indicated they had no plans to
pursue further legal action against NorthSide.122 The level of specificity
required for a TIF to meet the requirements of the statute remains an open
question in Missouri.
D. Public Reaction to the NorthSide TIF Case
The NorthSide rulings were controversial, and the opinions on the
decisions were sharply divided. However, local media was largely supportive
of the project, and coverage on the matter continued for years.123 A lengthy
editorial on the topic in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch in December 2012, titled
“Give NorthSide a Chance,”124 forcefully stated the paper’s support for the
project since the project went public in 2009.125 The paper contrasted the
NorthSide TIF with other TIFs in the St. Louis area that have “abused TIF laws
by granting subsidies in well-to-do suburbs for big-box retail projects that
cannibalize older retail operations . . . Meanwhile, the city’s overwhelmingly
poor, African-American north side is bogged down in court. Weeds grow,
criminals flourish, the few remaining residents hang on for dear life.”126
A local African-American periodical, the St. Louis American
(“American”), was among the staunchest supporters of the TIF, stating on its
Editorial page, “We encourage those who dislike McKee but care about the
future of the city to reconsider the critical value of his proposal to bring
development and jobs to an area of the city sorely lacking in both.”127 The
American even publicly debated the legal issues and judges involved in the
case, responding to an email from attorney Eric Vickers128 that stated, “The
American has thoroughly skewered and castigated Judge Robert Dierker for his

119. Id. at 24, 26.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 13.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2; Gentrification by TIF, supra note 5;
Rivas, supra note 32.
124. See Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Editorial, Perception vs. Law in Northside Appeal, ST. LOUIS AM. (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/editorials/article_dcbdcf1e-39c8-11e2-a33a-001a4bcf88
7a.html.
128. Vickers argued for plaintiffs as intervener in the NorthSide cases. See Smith II, 2012 WL
2317240.
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decision to void McKee’s proposal for being only a plan and not a project, his
decision rests squarely and entirely on the well-reasoned appellate decision [in
Shelbina]129of Supreme Court Justice George W. Draper III [supported by the
American for appointment to the Missouri Supreme Court].”130 The American
responded by stating it believes “Draper will show his sound legal judgment in
ruling that the narrow precedent he established in Shelbina does not pertain to
a redevelopment project that actually has a redeveloper and a redevelopment
agreement.”131
In addition to the media, a number of politicians and attorneys weighed in
on the matter. City of St. Louis Mayor Francis Slay stated that he was
committed to proceeding with the NorthSide development regardless of the
courts.132 He said it “was a very complex legal issue” but that his development
team was “absolutely” considering options and that “Paul McKee is moving
forward with his project.”133 St. Louis Alderman Scott Ogilvie stated that “Paul
McKee’s problems are our problems” because North St. Louis’ problems are
St. Louis’ problems.134
A brief signed by the three attorneys representing the City of St. Louis, the
Board of Aldermen and the TIF Commission states, “Taken to its logical end,
[the] approach [of our opponents] will unavoidably require Missouri’s courts
to second-guess legislative decisions and micromanage TIF-financed
redevelopment.”135
On the other side of the argument, north city residents stated that the plan
of NorthSide Regeneration was “pie-in-the-sky” and caused their property
values to drop.136 Bevis Schock, attorney for several north city residents,
argued before the Missouri Supreme Court, “I represent people who’ve been
harmed . . . So who is harmed? My client is harmed!”137 After the Missouri
Supreme Court ruling which allowed NorthSide to go ahead with TIF plans,

129. Shelbina v. Shelby Cnty., 245 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2008).
130. Editorial, No Dilemma Between Draper and Shelbina, ST. LOUIS AM., Dec. 6, 2012, at
A10.
131. Id.
132. State Supreme Court to Weigh in on McKee Plan, CBS ST. LOUIS LOCAL (Nov. 26,
2012), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/11/26/state-supreme-court-to-weigh-in-on-mckee-plan/.
133. Id.
134. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6, at A11.
135. Id.
136. Nicholas Phillips, Listen to Oral Argument from Yesterday’s High Court Battle Over
Paul McKee’s Project, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.
com/dailyrft/2012/11/oral_argument_supreme_court_mckee_north_side.php.
137. Id.
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Schock commented, “This is classic ‘crony capitalism’. . . [i]t’ll never
work.”138
Among the most vocal critics of the NorthSide plan was the chair of
Washington University’s Department of Economics, Mr. Michele Boldrin, who
testified at the trial that the benefits promised by McKee such as new jobs and
increases in property value were “dreamy,” “out of thin air,” “unreasonable,”
and “completely arbitrary”139 and further stated that “if an MBA student came
up with it, I’d throw him out of my office.”140
Though reaction to NorthSide rulings was mixed and sometimes sharp, the
attacks were largely on the specificity of developer Paul McKee’s plan or on
personal concerns with McKee, not the broader objective of redeveloping the
north side of St. Louis itself. 141 Attorney Schock stated, “The heart of this case
and 90 percent of the arguments focus on whether a project means a specific
building that has a door, a roof, a purpose, or not.”142 A St. Louis planner
remarked, “There is such a thing as making the area so big that you really can’t
have the plan be completely believable,” and, he said, “Maybe that’s what this
one is suffering from.”143
III. THE RATIONALE FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE TO
MISSOURI TIF LAW
A.

The Meaning of “Blight”

The original intent of TIF was “the clearance and rehabilitation of urban
decay in downtown areas”144 so, logically, “blight” was set as an essential

138. Adam Allington, Mo. Supreme Court Gives Paul McKee Green Light on Northside
Project, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO NEWS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/
mo-supreme-court-gives-paul-mckee-green-light-northside-project.
139. Nicholas Phillips, Wash U. Economist Rips McKee’s Plan for North St. Louis in First
Day of Trial, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (Feb. 17, 2010), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/daily
rft/2010/02/wash_u_economist_rips_mckees_plan_for_the_north_side.php.
140. Jeff Carroll & Michael Offerman, Blight, Plight & Urban Flight, WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS OLIN SUSTAINABILITY CASE COMPETITION (2013), available at
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/mba/casecompetition/PDF/2013OSCCCaseFinal.pdf.
141. See, e.g., Give NorthSide a Chance, supra note 2 (“Ever since Mr. McKee started
secretly buying parcels before convincing the Legislature to help him with tens of millions of
dollars in tax incentives, there have been people in St. Louis rooting for his failure. . .he’s a white
guy from the suburbs. . .he kept things secret for a while, even to the point of letting properties
run down. . .the idea is a long shot. But he’s working in a part of the city that began hollowing out
in the 1950s”).
142. Rivas, supra note 32.
143. Logan, supra note 1.
144. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1023.
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element of any area proposed for TIF redevelopment.145 However, the meaning
of blight in TIF law has evolved to the point where such a designation has “lost
any real meaning.”146 In testimony before the St. Louis TIF Commission, one
observer found that “‘blighting’ . . . [which is] supposed to be subject to
independent analysis [is] a rigged game.”147 Many find that “nearly any area
can qualify as blighted.”148 As one author noted,
the court’s semantic manipulation of the term “blight” ignores an underlying
reality that many of the controversial TIF projects in Missouri are not, by
common-sense standards, blighted. Thus, the TIF blighting test is made at best
illogical and at worse meaningless by the court’s statutory construction of the
149
term.

Under the standard of review for typical TIF cases,150 the court is not
permitted to substitute its judgment for the municipal board.151 As held in JG
St. Louis West, LLC v. Des Peres, factors such as limited space, improper
subdivision, a faulty roof, and so forth can meet the statutory definition of
“blight” if a municipality finds it.152 Thus, blight was found in a suburban
shopping mall deemed to be the economic engine of one of the wealthiest
suburbs in the area.153

145. See, e.g., Kenneth Hubbell & Peter J. Eaton, Tax Increment Financing in the State of
Missouri, MSCDC Economic Report Series No. 9703, at 2 (1997) available at http://www.cdfa.
net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ordredirect.html?open&id=HubbellEatonMissouri (“Early on, states
restricted TIF projects to ‘blighted’ or ‘substandard’ areas within the community. But over time,
bending to local political pressures, the requirements for such a designation were watered down
and lost any real meaning.”); Kenneth Thomas Luce, Reclaiming the Intent: Tax Increment
Finance in the Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER
ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, Apr. 2003, at 3 (author argues that combating blight as
“true purpose of TIF” and focuses study on “reclaiming the intent” of TIF.).
146. KELSAY, supra note 34.
147. David Stokes, The Use of Tax Increment Financing in the City of Saint Louis: Testimony
Before the Tax Increment Financing Commission of the City of Saint Louis, SHOW-ME
INSTITUTE, (Oct. 29, 2012), at 2, available at http://showmeinstitute.org/publications/testimony/
corporate-welfare/848-tif-in-saint-louis.html.
148. VanDyke, supra note 40, at 799.
149. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1050.
150. The standard of review described is used in TIF cases where no eminent domain or
condemnation is involved.
151. See, e.g., Tierney v. Planned Indus. Exp. Auth., 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1987) (en banc);
Meramec Valley R-III Sch. Dist. v. Eureka, 281 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2009); JG St.
Louis West, LLC v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2001).
152. JG St. Louis W., 41 S.W.3d at 518.
153. Id. See also Reinert, supra note 25, at 1019–1022; Ray Hartman, Des Peres Has Gone
Mad, But Don’t Take My Word for It, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Oct 6, 1999. (Economist Murray
Weidenbaum states, “To describe it [the West County mall] as a blighted area and keep a straight
face is quite a trick.”).
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Since the courts must defer to the municipality’s finding of blight, and
since there are no meaningful standards of blight in the statute, blight can be
found in almost any area, making the statutory meaning of blight essentially
meaningless.154 The result of the lack of a meaningful blight standard in TIF
law is that there is no economic incentive under TIF to develop in the areas
that need it the most.155
For example, a study in Kansas City found that 88% of TIF plans are in
areas that contain the most affluent and best educated, while areas with high
rates of poverty and unemployment receive only 12% of the TIFs.156
In St. Louis, a study found that TIFs are used more frequently in higherincome communities, giving them unneeded advantage and contributing to
economic and racial disparity in St. Louis.157 They were used often in the more
affluent central and west end of the city of St. Louis but little in the depressed
sections of north St. Louis.158 As the study summarized,
areas of concentrated poverty begin at a distinct disadvantage when trying to
compete for customers, businesses and jobs and are further handicapped when
higher-income communities receive additional advantages through diversion of
159
tax dollars to private developers via tax incentives.

Another study specifically about TIF in Missouri, this one supported by the
Brooking Institution,160 made a similar conclusion.161 It found that “Missouri
law creates the potential for overuse and abuse of TIF. Vague definitions of the
allowable use of TIF permit almost any municipality, including those market
forces already favor, to use it.”162 It further concluded that because of these
“flaws” in Missouri law, TIF is used in suburbs with little need for
assistance.163 Particularly in the St. Louis area, the study found that “TIF
money very frequently flows to purposes other than combating ‘blight’ in
disadvantaged communities—its classic purpose.”164
154. No Dilemma Between Draper and Shelbina, supra note 130.
155. Luce, supra note 145.
156. KELSAY, supra note 34, at 25.
157. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS
AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION:
FINAL REPORT, 35–37 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP.], available at
http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/library/dirr/TIFFinalRpt.pdf.
158. Id. The proposed redevelopment area of the NorthSide TIF is in a part of St. Louis that
has rarely been used for TIF prior to NorthSide.
159. Id. at 36.
160. The Brookings Institution was probably the first think-tank in the United States.
Brookings Institution, SOURCE WATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Brookings_Insti
tution (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
161. Luce, supra note 145, at v.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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The study did not fault the tool of TIF itself, but found that “poorly
designed TIF laws are being misused . . . As a result, a potentially dynamic
tool for reinvestment in Missouri’s most disadvantaged communities . . . is
abused by high-tax-base suburban areas that do not need public subsidies.”165
Ironically, because of the structure of TIF laws in Missouri, the very areas
that need it the most, the areas that would fit the dictionary definition of
“blight,”166 are not receiving the benefit of TIF. The TIF statutory requirement
of “blight” seems just a remnant of the early days of TIF which focused on
redevelopment and “rehabilitation of urban decay in downtown areas.”167
This note does not advocate the abolishment of TIF as a tool for nonblighted areas by developers. Rather, it argues for a new and separate “tier” in
Missouri TIF law that would further incentivize redevelopment in truly
blighted areas and accommodate the special needs of large-scale blighted
districts, such as that proposed by the NorthSide plan. Under the reform
proposed in this note, a TIF redevelopment area that meets a heightened
definition of blight would be given a separate “tier” in the Missouri TIF
statute. Under the current Missouri TIF statute, a “redevelopment area” must
meet the definition of either a “blighted area,” a “conservation area,” or an
“economic development area.”168 This note will refer to an area that meets the
proposed heightened standard of blight as a “true blight” area.
The definition of “true blight” in the modified statute could restrict
blighting to urban and residential areas and provide clearer, objective standards
for determining blight.169 Modification to the blight definition was attempted in
2002 in Missouri in the wake of the JG West St. Louis decision and the
blighting of the West County Center shopping mall.170 The legislation, never
enacted, includes objectively defined factors of high unemployment, low fiscal
capacity, and moderate income in its definition of blight.171 Provisions from

165. Id.
166. According to Dictionary.com, blight refers to “impairment, destruction, ruin, or
frustration” or “the state or result of being blighted or deteriorated; dilapidation; decay” as in
“urban blight.” Blight, DICTONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blight?s=t (last
visited Apr. 22, 2014).
167. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1023.
168. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (2010).
169. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the
Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 335 (2004).
170. Id. See S.B. 172, 92d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2003) (unenacted), available at
http://www.senate.state.mo.gov/03INFO/billtext/intro/SB172.htm.
171. S.B. 172, supra note 170. For example, the unenacted legislation defined “high
unemployment” as “unemployment in the proposed redevelopment area of at least one and onehalf times that of the metropolitan statistical area in which the area is located.” “Low fiscal
capacity” is defined as “per capita assessed valuation of property in the municipality of less than
sixty percent of the entire county in which it is located.” “Moderate income” is defined in part as
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this proposed legislation could be incorporated into the “true blight”
redevelopment area definition.
As former presidential economic advisor Murray Weidenbaum points out,
“The idea of a TIF is to help truly blighted areas by providing a tax incentive
for businesses to move into those areas.”172 Under the reform proposed in the
note, a developer seeking TIF funding to develop an area where “true blight” is
found would be entitled to special incentives and special provisions.
First, a “true blight” area may be entitled to increased tax incentives. A
general structure for increased incentives based on condition of redevelopment
area already exists at both a state and local level.173 Under the current statute,
additional tax incentives are available for blighted areas in pre-designated
enterprise zones, empowerment zones or urban core areas.174 This is called a
“State TIF” and allows access to incremental state sales tax to supplement the
amount of the local TIF.175 Kansas City has also introduced a “Super TIF” to
increase local incentives for residential development in “distressed areas.”176
By using a clear defined statutory framework, two different levels of TIF
incentives could be created, similar to the “State TIF” or “Super TIF,” with
heightened incentives for areas with “true blight,” in relation to non-blighted
development TIFs.
Second, a “true blight” redevelopment area, if it encompasses a large area,
would be allowed a more flexible two-step project implementation process and
relaxed specificity as described below in section B.
Finally, this note proposes either eliminating the definitions of blight
currently in the statute entirely, or replacing these definitions with
requirements that more realistically reflect the actual use of TIF for economic
development in a range of non-blighted areas.177 This approach has been

“median household income of under eighty percent of the median household income for the
metropolitan statistical area.”
172. Ray Hartman, Des Peres Has Gone Mad, But Don’t Take My Word for It, RIVERFRONT
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999. Weidenbaum goes on to say that TIF is “not designed for middle-class
neighborhoods. It’s designed for poor neighborhoods.”
173. See EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP., supra note 157.
174. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.845.4–99.845.14 (2010).
175. See MO. DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., STATE SUPPLEMENTAL TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
PROGRAM (2007), available at http://ded.mo.gov/upload/tif%2811-07%29.pdf.
176. See CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 4–5 (April
2004), available at http://www.kcmo.org/idc/groups/cityplanningplanningdiv/documents/city
planninganddevelopment/017322.pdf. The program has met with some criticism. See, e.g., Leigh
McIlvaine, “Super TIF” EATs Kansas City Alive!, CLAWBACK, A BLOG OF GOOD JOBS FIRST
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://clawback.org/2008/09/25/%E2%80%9Csuper-tif%E2%80%9D-eats-kan
sas-city-alive/.
177. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051–52.
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proposed by several authors in the past,178 and, in fact, the states of Iowa and
Indiana have dropped the “blight” test entirely.179 These states allow TIF to be
used in “Economic Development Areas,”180 which more accurately reflects its
actual use in Missouri, in areas such as suburban shopping malls and targeted
retail outlets like Wal-Mart. Previous attempts by the legislature to exclusively
limit TIF to an area like the “true blight” standard proposed above have failed
to garner the necessary support from lawmakers on several occasions.181 This
note proposes a solution that acknowledges the current use of TIF in suburban
development, but would free municipalities from “being forced to make
irrational declarations of blight that do not correspond to common-sense
notions of the term.”182 These “irrational declarations of blight” infuriate the
public because it seems a disingenuous use of taxpayer money.183 The State of
Ohio proposed a test that might be substituted for the current blighting
standard, based on “private market failure,” “sudden and severe economic
dislocation,” “unintended government policy impact,”184 and so forth. This
type of test, if carefully constructed, would serve to focus the TIF on true
economic development benefiting the region, rather than meeting a blight
standard that has no real meaning.
B.

Specificity and Accountability

Smaller, project-specific TIFs, those whose “redevelopment area” is
limited to a single structure or shopping mall, are unlikely to have specificity
issues.185 They have a clear agenda, with developers and contractors lined up,
typically for targeted retail development.186 On the other hand, large scale TIFs
that impact entire districts, such as the NorthSide plan, have many more
variables because of the time involved and the scale of infrastructural
improvements needed.187 The NorthSide trial court contrasted “discrete,
178. Reinert, supra note 25 (Recall the title of the article is “Tax Increment Financing In
Missouri: Is It Time For Blight And But-For To Go?”); David N. Farwell, A Modest Proposal:
Eliminating Blight, Abolishing but-for, and Putting New Purpose in Wisconsin’s Tax Increment
Financing Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 407, 431 (2005).
179. Hubbell & Eaton, supra note 145, at 1.
180. Id.
181. See S.B. 172 supra note 170; Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051.
182. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1051.
183. See, e.g., David Nicklaus, TIF Subsidy Tilts the Retail Playing Field, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2012 (commenting on a recent controversial use of TIF in St. Louis, “In plain,
commonsense English, ‘blighted’ means that a property is an eyesore or a nuisance. In real estate
law, it simply means that a property is eligible for a subsidy.”).
184. Reinert, supra note 25, at 1052.
185. See Logan, supra note 1. Urban planner John Brancaglione argues that the “easier” TIFs
are “small and specific,” driven by developers often for retail projects.
186. Id.
187. TIF BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

SPECIFICITY, BLIGHT AND TWO TIERS OF TIF

277

definable projects such as the shopping center upgrade in JG St. Louis West”
with the “grandeur and scope” of redevelopment plans of NorthSide.188
Concerns about specificity were the deciding factors in the NorthSide case at
the Missouri Court of Appeals.189 The court found no “specifics detailing
impending redevelopment projects,” citing terms like “anticipated” and
“depending on market demand” in the TIF Plan, and on this basis, the TIF was
declared invalid.190
The attorney for NorthSide summarized the core issue of the case:
“whether the TIF act can be used to subsidize large scale redevelopment
projects that will evolve over time with changing markets, politics and
technology.”191 He also stated that the court’s decision was “detached from the
commercial reality of large scale redevelopment.”192 Opposing attorney Bevis
Schock responded, “If Paul McKee thinks as a policy matter that we should
have large-scale TIF . . . he should go to the Legislature and get the law
changed.”193
St. Louis-based urban planner John Brancaglione questioned TIF law that
makes large projects harder to obtaining funding, “If you’re trying to induce
development in a large area, why make it more difficult? . . . You want to
make it more difficult when they’re going for a small project.”194 Brancaglione
added that changes to Missouri law requiring more detailed financial
projections have made it “tough for a city to create a district and then use the
incentive to lure developers.”195 He added other successful large-scale TIFs,
such as the Grand Center TIF which covered nearly 300 acres, might not “pass
muster” under the current standards of TIF law.196
While TIF has the greatest impact when entire neighborhoods are
transformed, large scale plans need some level of flexibility over the duration
of the plan, which could be decades. TIF plans can span up to twenty-three
years.197 Missouri courts have held that “discrete, definable projects”198 must
188. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *18.
189. Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240. As noted previously the case was later overturned on
procedural grounds by the Missouri Supreme Court. Smith III, 395 S.W.3d at 26.
190. Id.
191. Paul McKee Fights to Get His TIF Back for Northside Redevelopment Project, CBS
LOCAL ST. LOUIS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/02/01/paul-mckee-fightsto-get-his-tif-back-for-northside-redevelopment-project/.
192. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6.
193. Logan, supra note 1.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The $25 million Grand Center TIF, established in 2003, includes the main campus of
Saint Louis University. See Lisa Brown, Grand Center’s Court Victory Resurrects $130 Million
in Projects, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (July 25, 2005).
197. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(3) (2010). Estimated dates of completion can be up to twentythree years from the adoption of the ordinances approving the redevelopment project.
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be presented prior to approval of the TIF plan.199 Missouri courts have found
“aspirational” language such as “anticipated” and “depending on market
demand” not sufficient to meet the requirement of a project under the TIF
statute, and that it was likewise unacceptable that specific projects be decided
at a later time.200
The NorthSide TIF Redevelopment Plan, for example, stated that “up to
approximately” 2,200 new homes and 7,800 apartments “may be” constructed,
and that “up to approximately” 3,900 existing residential units could be
retained or rehabilitated, depending on the condition of such units and the
“market demand” for rehabilitated units.201 Another section states that an
adjacent area may be developed with “medium density mixed-use projects that
may contain ground floor retail with residences or offices above, depending
upon the market demand for such uses.”202 The estimates and “aspirational
language” was not acceptable to the Court.203 The trial court gave a
hypothetical example of the specificity required for an acceptable project:
“sanitary sewers will be constructed in City Block 1000, commencing on suchand-such a date, at an estimated cost of so many dollars.”204
NorthSide attorneys and others have argued that this approach makes large
scale TIF plans impossible, even though they have been approved by local
municipalities.205 They argue that a 1500-acre redevelopment spanning
decades requires flexibility and that the level of specificity required should be
left to the discretion of the municipality once a redevelopment agreement was
executed with a redeveloper.206 Others have argued that the NorthSide plan
was “pie-in-the-sky” and “unreasonable” and taxpayers must have the
specificity necessary to be assured of a viable plan.207
This note proposes that large-scale TIFs be approved in a more flexible,
two-step process. The redevelopment plan would require specific projects, but
not require that the specific projects for the entire redevelopment be presented
beforehand, prior to TIF approval. Rather, the entire plan and the funding
would be conditionally approved as the first step; but be contingent on a series

198.
199.
200.
201.

Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *18.
Smith II, 2012 WL 2317240, at *8–9.
Id. at *11.
NORTHSIDE REGENERATION LLC, NORTHSIDE REGENERATION TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING (TIF) REDEVELOPMENT PLAN 6 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21
411368/NorthSide-TIF-Redevelopment-Plan.
202. Id. at 21.
203. Smith I, 2010 WL 7352897, at *15.
204. Id.
205. Dierker’s ‘Issue’ with McKee Goes Before Supreme Court, supra note 6.
206. Brief of Appellant, Smith v. St. Louis, No. ED95733, 2012 WL 2317240, at *41–43
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. June 19, 2012).
207. See supra notes 136 and 139 and accompanying text.
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of “discrete, specific projects” that the municipality would approve on a
project-by-project basis through the course of the redevelopment. This note
also advocates modifying the TIF statute to include so-called “accountability
statutes” or “clawback” provisions that allow taxpayers to recoup the value of
local tax incentives if those outcomes don’t materialize.208 The proposed
statute would require the municipality to detail in the TIF agreement particular
levels of performance expected and consequences for not meeting these
expectations.209
To qualify for the increased level of flexibility this note proposes, the
redevelopment area must meet the standards of “true blight” and the area must
encompass a statutorily set minimum threshold of geographic size. This
approach allows the developer the necessary flexibility to implement largescale redevelopment, but also assures that the municipality is provided a
reasonable level of specificity by requiring definable projects, as well as
accountability and remedy through “clawback” provisions if the developer
does not deliver promised work or outcomes.
IV. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO MISSOURI TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING LAW
This note proposes changes to Missouri law to accommodate the distinct
characteristics of two different types of TIF. First, the proposal creates a new
level or “tier” of TIF, which provides for increased incentives and increased
flexibility. In order to qualify for these special incentives, a TIF must meet the
standards of “true blight” in keeping with the original intent of tax increment
financing to redevelop poorer neighborhoods and combat urban decay. To
address specificity concerns in large-scale TIFs, yet still maintain an incentive
to redevelop in truly blighted urban areas, this note advocates a two-step
implementation process for TIFs that meet the heightened definition of blight
in a larger redevelopment area. This would allow greater flexibility for largescale developers to develop on a more realistic, project-by-project basis, yet
still maintain specificity and accountability for each project within the overall
TIF plan. “Clawback provisions” allow taxpayers to recoup the value of local
tax incentives from developers if developer obligations are not met. It is
proposed that these provisions be incorporated into the Missouri TIF statute.
The other “tier” is more typical of TIFs across the state.210 A majority of
TIFs are for project-specific retail development, and, particularly in St. Louis,

208. EAST-WEST GATEWAY REP., supra note 157, at 36. Note that the city of St. Louis “has
required a ‘clawback’ provision in its redevelopment agreements since 2005.” It is not, however,
required by statute. This note proposes that a clawback provision be added to the statewide TIF
statute.
209. See KELSAY, supra note 34, at 27–28.
210. Luce, supra note 145, at 8, 11.
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TIFs are used “by suburban areas with little need for assistance.”211 This note
advocates eliminating the statutory “blight” test for this type of TIF, and
replacing it with tests that measure the TIF’s effectiveness in generating
economic development that benefits the region. In this way, the statutory test
reflects the nature and purpose of this type of TIF.
CONCLUSION
The NorthSide cases raise several important issues in Missouri TIF law.
Most obviously, how much specificity is required to meet the statutory
requirements of a TIF project in Missouri? Yet other questions are also
implied: How important is blight in determining the validity of TIF? How can
laws be constructed to incentivize large-scale urban redevelopment, yet still
assure developer accountability? The NorthSide TIF stands in sharp contrast in
nature and scope to the more typical TIFs in Missouri involving targeted retail
development. This note seeks to find a reasonable path of reform. It seeks a
balanced approach by tightening standards in certain areas, eliminating
meaningless standards in other areas, and providing flexibility in still other
areas.
Tax increment financing is a powerful tool for both redevelopment and
development. It has the power to reclaim whole neighborhoods that are truly
blighted and also to facilitate many smaller development projects that stimulate
economic growth. TIF involves many billions of dollars in Missouri taxes, and,
furthermore, it has impact on school districts, communities, and businesses
large and small. It is essential that the nature of tax increment financing law
reflect the nature of the development itself in order to optimize the benefits of
TIF and to minimize its abuse.
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